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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
In the interest of
RONALD G. BACON,
Case No. 15932

A person under eighteen years
of age.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Ronald Bacon, a juvenile, was charged under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953) as amended, with the
crime of aggravated robbery of Cheryl's Gift Shop wherein
$120.00 was taken on or about March 10, 1978, from Terri
Lium, an employee.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\'IER COURT
The case was heard on June 16, 1978, before the
Honorable Judge, John Farr Larson, Second District Juvenile
Court for Salt Lake County, who sat without a jury and who
reached a verdict of Guilty.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent urges this Court to affirm the
trial court's decision finding appellant guilty of the
offense charged.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of March 10, 1979, Teri Lium was
working at Cheryl's Gift Shop at the Olympus Hills
Shopping Center.

At 7:45p.m., she noticed an individual

(described as between 15 to 17 years old, about 5'7" or
5'8", blonde, weighing about 150 pounds, wearing a red
ski parka with black ski gloves, blue denim pants and
shirt and had "rosy" sunburned cheeks), browsing through
the

s~~p.

(Tr. 4).

She became suspicious he might be a shoplifter
Miss Lium had direct eye contact with the

individual several times as she watched him (Tr. 4), and
at one point he picked up a poster and asked her the
cost (Tr. 4, 12, 13).
The individual approached Miss Lium, put a
paper sack on the counter and told her to "put all the
money in there"

(Tr. 6-9).

Miss Lium testified that she

was no more than one foot away from the individual facing
him directly (Tr. 8).

Miss Lium said "what" and he

repeated himself (Tr. 9).

Miss Lium testified that she

placed the money ($120.00)

in the paper sack.

She
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stated she was scared because the individual had
unzipped his coat exposing a gun which was stuffed in
his pants

(Tr. 9).
The robber then asked Miss Lium for the keys

to the store, escorted her to the backroom, and locked
her in (Tr. 10, ll).

She escaped into the alley through

the back door and called the police from the store
next door.

She glanced at the clock in Fernwoods and it

was 8:15 p.m.

(Tr. ll).

Miss Lium told the officers about the poster
the robber had handled and several prints were lifted.
One ultimately matched appellant's right thumb print.
(Tr. 12, 13, 30, 32).

The officers instructed Miss Lium

to go home and look through some yearbooks to see if
she could find the robber's picture (Tr. 16).

She found the

robber's picture in the Churchill Junior High yearbook
and phoned the police (Tr. 16).
After

Miss Lium had identified appellant's

picture, the officers went to appellant's residence
around midnight (R. 43).

The officers asked appellant's

mother if they could speak to him (Tr. 43), and then asked
her if appellanL owned a red parka and she stated yes
and retrieve~ it for them along with some black ski gloves
(Tr.

45).
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The officers questioned appellant about his
whereabouts that night.

Appellant denied being in

the gift shop and told the officers he was not sure even
what gift shop they were talking about (Tr. 46, 55, 56).
The officers asked appellant to get the clothes he was
wearingthatnight.

Appellant went downstairs and returned

with a denim shirt and some levis

(Tr. 45, 55 69).

Appellant

was arrested and the articles of clothing were taken as
evidence.
At trial, Miss Lium positivelY identified
appellant as theonewho robbed her (Tr. 3).

Appellant

admitted being at the shopping center that night but claimed
he was home when the robbery took place (Tr. 63).

When

confronted with the fingerprint on the poster, appellant
explained he had been in the shop two days prior on
March 8, 1979, and handled it then (Tr. 70).

It should

be noted that appellant denied ever being in the shop
when the officers initially questioned him (Tr. 45, 55, 56).
Also, two fingerprint experts testified that even under
ideal conditions, a fingerprint would probably last a
maximum of 36 hours (Tr. 39, 60).
Appellant's mother testified that appellant
was home shortly after eight, when the robberywas alleged
to have taken place (Tr. 99).

She admitted that she had

not actually looked at the time her son came in

(Tr. 102).
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She also admitted being defensive about the time because
of its importance and that she "knew her son and there was
no way he could do such a thing"

(Tr. 103).

Judge John Farr Larson, sitting without a
jury, concluded that based on Miss Lium's testimony and
the fingerprint, appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crime of aggravated robbery

(Tr. 121).

The

appellant's claim of error focuses on the sufficiency of
the evidence presented at trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF GUILTY
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS SUCH
THAT REASONABLE MINDS COULD
BELIEVE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT APPELLANT COMHITTED
THE CRIME OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amended, which
provides:
A person commits aggravated
robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a)
Uses a firearm or a
facsimile of a firearm, knife or
a facsimile of a knife or deathly
weapon; or
Robbery is defined by statute as "the unlawful
and intentional tilking of personal property in the
possession or prcs?ncc of another person, against his will,
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accomplished by means of force or fear."
§

Utah Code Ann.

76-6-301 (1953), as amended.
Appellant's contention is that the trial judge

erred in finding the prosecution had proved all of the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The rules governing the scope of appellate
review as to sufficiency of the evidence in juvenile court
cases are well settled.

In State v. Middlestadt,

579 P.2d

908 (Utah 1978) , this Court in referring to the juvenile
court stated:
. that court must conform to
practices and procedures provided for
by law or rule of court in district
court criminal proceediDgs. Those
p~ocedures include a requirement that
gu1lt must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. However, this Court will not
overturn the judgment of the trial
court absent a showing of error,
prejudice, or insufficient evidence.
The test to be applied is that the
evidence submitted must be so improbable so as to make it completely
unbelieveable such that the conviction
could not possibly stand.
579 P.2d at 909.
Moreover, this Court in State v. Romero,

554

P.2d 216 (Utah, 1976), also said:
This court has long upheld the
standard that on an appeal from
conviction the court cannot weigh
the evidence nor say what quantum
is necessary to establish a fact
beyond a reasonable doubt so lonq
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as the evidence given is substantial.
Further, this court has maintained
that its function is not to determine
guilt or innocence, the weight to
give conflicting evidence, the
credibility of witnesses, or the
weight to be given defendant's
testimony.
554 P.2d at 218.
Reasonable doubt is described as follows:
"Reasonable doubt" is not a
mere imaginary, captious, or a
possible.doubt, but a fair doubt,
based upon reason and common
sense, and growing out of
testimony in the case, and it is
such doubt as will leave juror's
mind, after a careful examination
of all evidence, in such condition
that he cannot say he has an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty,
of defendant's guilt.
State v. Taylor, 21 U.2d 425, 446 P.2d 954 (1968).
State v. Sullivan, 6 U.2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957) cert.
denied 355 U.S. 848, 2 L.Ed.2d 57, 78 S.Ct. 74 (1957),
further adds:
. proof beyond all peradventure
of doubt could seldom be had, nor does
the law require it.
Respondent submits that the evidence presented
at trial, viewed under the above standards,is substantial
and more than sufficient to support the verdict that
appellant was guilty of the crime of aggravated robbery.
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Terri Lium positively identified appellant
and at trial stated that there was no doubt in her mind
that appellant was the robber (Tr. 18) .

Miss Limn also

picked out appellant's picture from among hundreds

(Tr. 16).

This Court in Middlestadt, supra, ruled that,
in general, the uncorroborated testimony of the victim
alone may sustain a conviction even where that testimony
conflicts in some respects.
92 Idaho 731 449 P.2d 837

See also State v. Rasmussen,

(1969), Morse v. State, 438 P.2d

309 (Okla. 1968), Ballard v. Sup. Ct. of San Diego City,
410 P.2d 838 (Cal. 1966).
In this case, Miss Lium's testimony does not
conflict in any respects.
are in the

~dentification

The only conflicts which arise
of shirt and levis which Miss

Liurn stated were different from the ones appellant wore
during the robbery (Tr. 6, 7, 19 20).

It is important

to note, however, that appellant is the one who retrieved
the clothes for the officers (Tr. 69).

Miss Lium was certain,

however, that the red parka (Exhibit 3), was worn by the
robber.

She stated she recognized the unique "slit" in

the pockets (Tr. 3, Exhibit 3).
The other conflict in testimony
time element.

is to the

Appellant clilims he was home at

, the robbery took place.

the~

tir1c'

His mother, although she did not

look at a clock, stated that she was sure he was

hoin~:

at
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that time (Tr. 102, 103).
witness credibility.
P.2d 466

This is simply an issue of

This Court in State v. Howard, 544

(Utah, 1975), in a rape case, was forced with

only the conflicting testimony
victim.

of the assailant and the

This Court stated:
As opposed to the foregoing,
the defendant argues some inconsistencies
and what he considers unreasonable
aspects of the prosecutrix's story,
which should leave at least a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt. The State's
correct rejoinder to this is that
the credibility of the witnesses was
the exclusive prerogative of the trial
court; and that it is neither the duty
nor the privilege of this court to
disagree and substitute its judgment
thereon.

544 P.2d

~t

168.

Respondent points out that if the defendant's
self-serving statements were all that was required to
raise a reasonable doubt, successful prosecution would
be impossible.
The

testimony of Miss Lium alone would be

sufficjent to sustain the verdict.

However, in addition,

appellant's fingerprint was found at the scene.
in State In the interest of Marquez, 560 P.2d
1977), held that the defendant's fingerprint

The Court
342 (Utah,

found at

the scene of tltc burglary was sufficient to sustain his

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-9- errors.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain

conviction.

In that case, the

dcfend~nt

was unknown to

the victim and offered no explanation as to why the
fingerprint was there.
In this case, ap}ellant was unknown to Miss
Lium.

She told the officers which poster the robber had

handled and the print was in fact lifted from the
poster (Exhibits 5, 9-12, Tr. 31, 32).

Appellant attempted

to explain that he had been in the shop two days prior
to the robbery and had handled the poster then (Tr. 70).
Again, appellant's credibility is in issue in light of
the investigating officer's statements that appellant
denied being in the shop or even knowning which shop they
were

refer=~~J

~~

!Tr. 45, 55, 56).

Also, the testimony

of the fingerprint experts indicating a fingerprint will
last only thirty-six hours

maxi~um

(Tr. 39, 60), directly

contradicts the possibility of appellant's print lasting
48 hours as appellant claims.
Howard,

su~,

Applying the rule in

the trial court could reasonably believe

appellant was in the shop the night of the robbery and
following Marquez, supra, conclude appellant in fact did
rob the shop.
Appellant contends that since no gun and no
money were found, the prosecution has failed to prove those
elements of aggravated robbery.
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Miss Lium stood facing the appellant no more than
one foot apart.

She said the appellant had an automatic

pistol stuffed in his pants with the handle clearly
visible (Tr. 8, 9).

She stated she was afraid that the

appellant might use the gun (Tr. 10, 11).
Following appellant's argument to its logical
conclusion, convictions for aggravated robbery could
easily be circumvented by the robber merely throwing
the weapon into a nearby lake or canal.

The law does not

require that the actual weapon be found.

This Court has

ruled that the victim's testimony
gun is found.

is enough even where no

In State v. Turner, 572 P.2d 388 (Utah

1977), the victim testified that the defendant had what
looked like the barrell of a gun protruding from his
shirt.

The victim stated he thought it was a gun, but

no gun was actually found.

This Court upheld the jury's

verdict finding defendant guilty of aggravated robbery in
that case.
Furthermore, respondent submits that Miss Lium's
testimony that the money \vas taken is enough to show
that element of the offense.

As stated in Middlestadt,

supra, the victim's testimony alone may be enough to
sustain the conviction, and a fortiorari it is sufficient
as to this element.
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I

I
I
I

Appellant has presented no evidence to impeach
Miss Lium's testimony.

I
I

The only factual inconsistencies

I
I

in her testimony result directly from apoellant's own
self-serving testimony which is suspect.

I

I

CONCLUSION

I

The prosecution presented evidence to establish

l

beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense
of aggravated robbery.

Miss Lium's unimpeached testimony

conclusively establishes appellant's guilt.

Moreover,

the physical evidence of the fingerprint and identification
of the parka and gloves are more than substantial to
suppor~

the trial court's verdict and corroborate Miss

Lium's testimony.
As stated in Middlestadt, supra, the tria}
court was in a better position to judge the demeanor of
witnesses and pass on their credibility.
testimony

W?S

Appellant's

directly contradicted by himself and

fingerprint experts.

Respondent submits the trial

court properly exercised its discretion, weighed

the

evidence, and found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of aggravated robbery.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DOFIUS
AssistanL Attorn~y General
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